The Battle of Ideology: Seeking the Strategy for Indoctrinating Pancasila for Those Who Are Anti-Pancasila

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Abstract

The present article aims to explore the strategy of indoctrinating Indonesian state ideology, Pancasila, towards the anti-Pancasila groups. The data is primarily based on the combination of primary data from the interview with the guardians of terrorists from eight prisons in Indonesia and secondary data from the open-source internet data. The study finds that the strategy for indoctrinating the Pancasila ideology must consider classifying people's level of disagreement with the Pancasila ideology, namely: supporter, follower, and militant. Supporters are those who are anti-Pancasila without having any plausible reasons. Therefore, the key to the problem lies in the socialization of Pancasila, which includes the educational and cultural approaches. Followers are anti-Pancasila and have reasons not to like Pancasila but do not show it to the public. Therefore, the key to solving the problem is not only the socialization of Pancasila but also the deconstruction of their understanding of Pancasila. The anti-Pancasila militants have reasons not to like Pancasila and actively promote and oppose Pancasila. The key to responding to it is combining hard and soft approaches in indoctrinating Pancasila.

Keywords: *indoctrination; Pancasila; ideology; supporter; follower; militant*

Abstrak

Artikel ini bertujuan untuk membahas strategi indoktrinasi ideologi Pancasila bagi orang atau kelompok yang anti-Pancasila. Data yang digunakan merupakan kombinasi data primer dari wawancara dengan wali narapidana teroris di delapan Lembaga Pemasyarkatan di Indonesia dan data sekunder dari data open-source internet. Kajian ini menemukan bahwa strategi indoktrinasi ideologi Pancasila harus mempertimbangkan klasifikasi tingkat penolakan seseorang terhadap ideologi Pancasila, yaitu: pendukung, pengikut, dan militan. Pendukungnya adalah mereka yang anti Pancasila dengan tidak mengetahui alasan ketidaksuakannya. Oleh karena itu, kunci permasalahannya terletak pada sosialisasi Pancasila yang mencakup pendekatan pendidikan dan budaya. Pengikut adalah mereka yang anti Pancasila dan memiliki alasan untuk tidak menyukai Pancasila, akan tetapi mereka tidak menunjukkannya kepada publik. Oleh karena itu, kunci pemecahan masalah tidak semata sosialisasi Pancasila, tetapi juga dekonstruksi pemahaman mereka tentang Pancasila secara sebenarnya. Militan adalah mereka yang anti Pancasila, mempunyai alasan untuk tidak menyukai Pancasila, dan aktif mempromosikan dan menentang Pancasila. Oleh karena itu strategi untuk menyikapinya adalah dengan memadukan pendekatan keras (pendekatan hukum) dan lunak (kemanusian dan kebudayaan) dalam mengindoktrinasi Pancasila.

Kata Kunci: *indoktrinasi; Pancasila; ideologi; pendukung; pengikut; militan*

INTRODUCTION

Two major challenges related to the Indonesian national ideology today are the problem of implementing Pancasila in the life of the nation and state and the desire of some people and groups to replace Pancasila as the ideology of the state.[1] The KPK records that there have been 429 regional heads, as a result of the PILKADA, stumbling over corruption cases. In addition, during the COVID-19 pandemic, several officials and party figures were caught in corruption cases of social assistance funds (social assistance) and embezzlement of aid funds affected by COVID-19 for Islamic boarding schools.[2] In a difficult situation affected by COVID-19, the community is conspicuously exposed to the abuse of Pancasila values by figures and officials who are supposed to uphold and encourage the implementation of Pancasila in the daily life of the nation and state.

The second challenge and threat that is no less important to be considered is the desire to replace Pancasila or the citizens of Indonesia who do not like Pancasila. Weaknesses in implementation and cases of abuse of Pancasila values are often used to justify the anti-Pancasila movement itself. It is even indicated that some general public wants to replace the Pancasila ideology with other ideologies. The CSIS survey also stated that around 9.5% of the millennial generation agreed that Pancasila was changed with another ideology. In line with this, the Young Pancasila Community also surveyed young people aged 18-25 years. The results stated that 19.5% of youths felt unsure that Pancasila values were important or relevant in their lives and responded neutrally to the importance of Pancasila in their lives.

The LSI Denny JA survey, with a more heterogeneous target population and conducted periodically from 2005 to 2018, stated that the perception of the pro-Pancasila community had decreased by 10 percent. For example, the number of pro-Pancasila people was 85.2 percent in 2005, 81.7 in 2010, 79.4 percent in 2010, and then decreased to 75.3 percent in 2018.[3] This decline can be an alarm, a warning bell, for national security.

In comparison to the problem of Pancasila's implementation, from a sociological perspective, the rejection of Pancasila needs more attention because Pancasila is the meeting point of the agreement this nation has stood for until now. Borrowing the term sociologist Emile Durkheim, Pancasila is the collective consciousness of the Indonesian nation. According to Durkheim, collective consciousness is the foundation of a community group. If this collective consciousness is weak, then the society's order of life is weak. Therefore, maintaining Pancasila and translating it into the daily life of the nation and state is absolute.

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[1] Fadilah, N. (2019). Tantangan dan Penguatan Ideologi Pancasila dalam Menghadapi Era Revolusi Industri 4.0. *Journal of Digital Education, Communication, and Arts (DECA)*, *2*(02), pp. 66-78, Zubaidi, A., & Sutarmanto, H. (2019). Indeks Ketahanan Ideologi Pancasila. *Jurnal Ketahanan Nasional*, *25*(2), pp. 277-294, and Muslimin, H. (2016). Tantangan terhadap pancasila sebagai ideologi dan dasar negara pasca reformasi. *Jurnal Cakrawala Hukum*, *7*(1), 30-38.

[2] Luqman Nurhadi Arunanta (2021, March 13). *Pimpinan KPK Catat Ada 429 Kepala Daerah Hasil Pilkada Terjerat Korupsi* https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5498530/pimpinan-kpk-catat-ada-429-kepala-daerah-hasil-pilkada-terjerat-korupsi. and Khaerul Anwar (2021,April 20). *Dugaan Penerima Hibah Ponpes Fiktif di Banten, Begini Kata Kemenag.* Idntimes. https://banten.idntimes.com/news/banten/khaerul-anwar-2/dugaan-penerima-hibah-ponpes-fiktif-di-banten-begini-kata-kemenag/3.

[3] Sakina Rakhma Diah Setiawan (2018, July 17). *Survei: Dalam 13 Tahun, Persentase Publik Pro Pancasila Terus Menurun.* Kompas. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/07/17/15580981/survei-dalam-13-tahun-persentase- publik-pro-pancasila-terus-menurun.

All components of the nation must have a collective awareness that Pancasila is the ideology of the state, the basis of the state, and the way of life. Therefore, when the bond is released (belief in Pancasila as a collective consciousness), this nation has the potential to fundamental social problems leading to destruction.

In addition, more discussions about the implementation of Pancasila in everyday life have been carried out, compared to the issue of indoctrination of the Pancasila ideology against people and groups who are anti-Pancasila. [4] The antis referred to in this essay are people or groups willing to replace Pancasila with another ideology (even though they have no problem or hate Pancasila) to hate and want to replace Pancasila. Therefore, the present article discusses the problem of indoctrination of the Pancasila ideology towards people or groups who are anti-Pancasila. In doing so, this article identifies people or groups who do not like Pancasila, their reasons and strategies against Pancasila or promoting anti-Pancasila, and how to deal with these groups, and at the same time instilling the Pancasila ideology against the person or group. This paper is expected to provide strategic and tactical input to the Government of Indonesia to formulate a new P4 model, deal with anti-Pancasila groups, and straighten their understanding of Pancasila as the state ideology of the Republic of Indonesia.

METHODOLOGY

The present article employs a qualitative analysis, which focuses on data content to find the data's pattern, decomposition, and abstract. The data were collected through interviews and open-source documents. The interview was collected from 11 guardians of terrorist prisoners, and therefore, it is the primary data of the research. They came from the male prisons of Ambon, Pasir Putih, Lapas Besi, Karang Anyar, Permisan, and Medan, and the female prisons of Tangerang and Medan. The documents were collected from the open-source internet that publishes research on the issues of radicalism, anti-Pancasila, and nationalism, conducted by credible survey institutions, such as Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), the Mata Air Foundation, and Alvara Research Center.

The data were analyzed to find the pattern of the target of the study, individuals and groups who are anti-Pancasila, or against the state's ideology. The output of the analysis is the classification of anti-Pancasila people and its consequence on the strategy for indoctrinating based on their typologies and classifications. During this process of analysis, the data was classified which was most relevant, less relevant, and irrelevant to the objectives of the present study (abstraction) and classified, as well as decomposed the problems of indoctrination strategy of Pancasila into parts or subs of the problems (decomposition). Therefore, the data analysis was not only about the strategy of indoctrinating Pancasila, which

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[4] The issue of internalization and indoctrination of Pancasila has been one of the central programs of the government. For example, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research, Technology, and Higher Education launched the program of Pancasila Student Profile (Profil Pelajar Pancasila); The Pancasila Ideology Development Agency (Badan Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila) issued a law of BPIP Regulation Number 1/2021 concerning Implementing Regulations of Presidential Decree Number 13/2021 concerning the Development of Pancasila Ideology to the Young Generation through the Paskibraka Program. The BPIP also has created various other programs to encourage the implementation of Pancasila in the entire life of the nation and state.

has been implemented partially or suggested by practitioners of indoctrination of the ideology, but also the classification of individuals and groups who are anti-Pancasila.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

As briefly stated by the data above, it is clear that some people or groups want and replace the Pancasila ideology (anti-Pancasila). They almost exist in all segments of society, such as age, gender, ethnicity, and job. There is no particular social pattern in that group. In the LSI Deny JA survey, it can be seen that the percentage of people who suggest replacing the Pancasila ideology for 13 years is quite significant, 15-25 percent.[5] Similarly, although somewhat low, the Center for Political Communication Studies (CPCS) in 2020 found that 13.3 percent of the population wanted the replacement of Pancasila or turning Indonesia into a religious state.[6]

In addition, at a slightly different time, the Mata Air Foundation and Alvara Research Center found that 23.4 percent of university students and 23.3 percent of senior high school students agree with establishing an Islamic state, a caliphate in Indonesia. And more specifically, 16.8 percent of students and 18.6 percent chose religious ideology over Pancasila nationalist ideology.[7]

As for the employees of state civil apparatus (ASN) and state-own enterprise (BUMN), Alvara found that 19.4 percent of ASN employees and 18.1% of BUMN employees wanted to replace the Pancasila ideology. Even 22.2 percent of ASN employees and 10.3 percent of BUMN employees agree that the state nationalist ideology, the Pancasila, is replaced by the Islamic ideology, the Khilafah.[8] The director-general of Politics and General Administration of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri), Major General (Purn.) Soedarmo responded to this by stating that this number of anti-Pancasila in civil servants was the cause of the weakness of national resilience.[9]

This anti-Pancasila perception is among civilians and security apparatus: military and police personnel. Based on internal data, the Minister of Defense of the Jokowi-JK administration, Ryamizard Ryacudu, added that approximately 3 percent of military personnel had been exposed to radicalism, including the willingness to replace Pancasila and

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[5] Sakina Rakhma Diah Setiawan (2018, July 17). *Survei: Dalam 13 Tahun, Persentase Publik Pro Pancasila Terus Menurun*. Kompas. https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/07/17/15580981/survei-dalam-13-tahun-persentase- publik-pro-pancasila-terus-menurun.

[6] JPNN (2020, November 25).Survei Terbaru: 13,3 Persen Publik Ingin Indonesia Jadi Negara Agama. JPNN. https://www.jpnn.com/news/survei-terbaru-133-persen-publik-ingin-indonesia-jadi-negara-agama?page=2.

[7] Hasanudin Aco (2017, October 31). *Survei: 23,4 Persen Mahasiswa dan Pelajar Terjangkit Paham Radikal*. https://www.tribunnews.com/nasional/2017/10/31/survei-234-persen-mahasiswa-dan-pelajar-terjangkit-paham-radikal.

[8] Adib Muttaqin Asfar (2017, October 2013). *Duh! Sebagian PNS & Karyawan BUMN Pro Khilafah & Anti-Pancasila*. Solopos. https://www.solopos.com/duh-sebagian-pns-karyawan-bumn-pro-khilafah-anti-pancasila-862629.

[9] Hendra Friana. (2018, November 17). *Kemendagri Sebut 19,4 Persen PNS Tak Setuju Ideologi Pancasila*. Tirto. https://tirto.id/daef.

make Indonesia an Islamic state.[10] Similarly, the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Social Conflict at the University of Indonesia found that in the 2010-2015 period, there were 23 state apparatus from ASN, military, and police involved in terrorism.[11] Even some of the terrorists arrested by Densus 88 were members and former members of the national police, such as in the case of Bripda Nesti OS.[12]

The diverse backgrounds of the people, who are anti-Pancasila, show that the data do not form any certain social patterns. Millennial generation children who have better digital access to the history of Pancasila and knowledge of Pancasila values show a high percentage of anti-Pancasila relative to other social groups. Similarly, the security forces: the military, and police, often assumed to have the best indoctrination program of state ideology, are still exposed to anti-state ideology, despite their low percentage number in the survey. Therefore, the strategy of indoctrinating the Pancasila ideology must be carried out in a comprehensive and well-integrated manner.

Because of the social backgrounds that do not illuminate the characters as well as the classification of the anti-Pancasila people, the Department of Corrections of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights has classified terrorist prisoners as groups that are mainly against Pancasila. They are classified based on their ideological commitment into four groups; ideologist, militant, supporter, and sympathizer. First, ideologists are the terrorist prisoners who are the intellectual actors or motivators of the terrorist movement. At the same time, they actively spread anti-Pancasila ideology, the terrorist ideology. Ideologists either work in organizational networks or individually without any connection to terrorist groups, and they produce actors of violent extremism and terrorism. Second, militants are the actor and executors of terrorism. These people are trained and prepared to commit terrorist activities, such as fundraising and suicide missions. As a result of brainwashing by ideologists, militants are no longer afraid to die either when they detonate a bomb, are caught, executed, or are caught in prison. Third, supporters are terrorist prisoners who voluntarily provide supporting facilities for terrorists (ideologists or militants), such as training, funding, and hiding places for terrorists. This group becomes dangerous because it determines the success or failure of terrorism. Fourth, sympathizers are prisoners who believe in and carry radical ideas that potentially support terrorism. The threat from this group is more of an indirect threat, namely providing ideological support such as the importance of an Islamic

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[10] Ryn/Dea. (2019, Juni 19). *Menhan Sebut 3 Persen Anggota TNI Terpapar Radikalisme.* CNN. https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20190619113157-20-404549/menhan-sebut-3-persen- anggota-tni-terpapar-radikalisme.

[11] BKN. (2015, Desember18). *Selama 2010-2015 Tercatat 23 orang PNS dan Anggota TNI/Polri terlibat dalam Kasus Terorisme.* BKN. https://www.bkn.go.id/berita/selama-2010-2015-tercatat-23-orang-pns-dan-anggota-tnipolri- terlibat-dalam-kasus-terorisme.

[12] Lihat (2019, Oktober 14).*Polwan terpapar paham radikal indikasi 'bahaya luar biasa', pemerintah diminta lakukan audit ideologi.* BBC. Polwan terpapar paham radikal indikasi 'bahaya luar biasa', pemerintah diminta lakukan audit ideologi - BBC News Indonesia. In December 2021, during the visit in the prisons, the author met these two former police officers, including Nesti. They have acknowledged their mistakes and pledged alliance to the nationalist ideology, the Pancasila.

state, '*Khilafah*', and '*jihad*'. They usually facilitate the spread of radical violent ideas and are often exclusive.[13]

In addition to this, the guardians of the terrorist prisoners classify into three groups. First, the ones who do not cooperate well with guardians and reject bluntly reject Pancasila as the state ideology. Second, the ones who cooperate well with guardians admit their mistakes and admit Pancasila as the state's ideology. Third, the ones who are not clear about their commitment to Pancasila. For example, they pledged a written loyalty to Pancasila, but their attitudes and behavior show the opposite direction.[14]

Therefore, adopting these classifications of terrorist prisoners who clearly and often publicly reject Pancasila, and considering the level of risk and severity of their antipathy to Pancasila, the anti-Pancasila persons can be categorized into three groups or levels. They are namely supporters (mild), followers (moderate), and militants (severe). These terms are in the form of an ordinal Likert scale (mild-medium-severe) to simplify the complexities of people or groups who are anti-Pancasila. However, the author realizes that this classification cannot be compared equally to the classification made by the Department of Corrections and the guardian of terrorist prisoners. All of the groups classified are the persons who have been charged for their crimes against Pancasila. While other groups outside the prisons, as depicted by the surveys, do not necessarily show their thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors of anti-Pancasila. Nevertheless, this classification is expected to cover all characteristics and patterns of the anti-Pancasila persons in prison and outside the prison, as.

First, Supporters are the people who want to replace Pancasila or are anti-Pancasila, but they do not have certain reasons that cause them to dislike Pancasila. They just follow the surroundings and or seek their interests. This category is assumed to be the lightest category to anticipate because other ideological thoughts have not contaminated them. Still, they express anti-Pancasila only because of the social environment around them or other circumstances.

Groups that fall into this category include children who are not yet adults who perceive anti-Pancasila. For example, a guardian of a terrorist argued that a girl of a terrorist in his prison stated that when she was with her parents, her parent forbode her to sing the anthem Indonesia Raya, say Pancasila and salute the Indonesian flag. She also did not know the reasons because he was still under eight years old.[15] In addition, children do not like Pancasila. It could also be because of the indoctrination of teachers at school. For example, in Jambi, it was alleged that some schools did not want to hold a flag ceremony every Monday and also forbade flag salutes.[16]

There is also an allegation that some percentages of anti-Pancasila students and youths, as found in the various surveys above, do not all have reasons to hate Pancasila. They may consider Pancasila as an ordinary and unimportant thing. So, if another ideology

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[13] Direktorat Jenderal Pemasyarakat. 2017. Buku Pedoman Rehabilitasi dan Reedukasi Narapidana Tindak Pidana Terorisme.

[14] Interview with a guardian of terrorist prisoners on 13 December 2021.

[15] Interview with a guardian of terrorist prisoners on 14 December 2021.

[16] Bangun Santoso. (2017, Desember 10). *Larang Siswa Upacara Bendera, Izin Sekolah Terancam Dicabut*. Liputan6. https://www.liputan6.com/regional/read/3190592/larang-siswa-upacara-bendera-izin-sekolah-terancam-dicabut.

replaces the state ideology, it is deemed normal for them. Therefore, some argue that this may be the impact of the abolition of Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila program (Guidelines for Understanding and Practicing Pancasila), or P4 and Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (BP7) through TAP MPR No XVIII/MPR/1998. Since then, the understanding of state ideology, Pancasila, has changed. Some, especially the youth generations, ignore Pancasila and even become anti-Pancasila. [17] Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the dissolution of P4 and BP7 without being prepared for its replacement and anticipating an alternative institution to promote Pancasila has made more youth generations lose the meaning and values of Pancasila.[18] So, Pancasila is considered an ordinary thing like clothes, which can be changed at any time.

For adults, the anti-Pancasila may come from political disappointment or low trust in government. Therefore, they feel relative deprivation. For example, they have good efficacy in looking at the social and political lives, but they see imperfections in the lives of society. They understand the resources of Indonesia, but they see poverty easily and cases of corruption frequently. Therefore, they may feel deprived. Then, this deprivation is embodied in the form of anti-Pancasila.

This group may pose a long-term threat to the state. Because borrowing the term of Durkheim's collective consciousness, this group threatens the ideology of the state, Pancasila as a meeting point of the diverse interests, needs, social and other factors, or the collective consciousness of being Indonesians. Therefore, their hatred may grow when the anti-Pancasila among this group (without reason) is not responded to well and carefully. Soon, they will find the logic and rationality to legitimize their anti-Pancasila. Interventions and corrections by the state at this stage of anti-Pancasila are important and are likely to be easier than those who have the reasoning of anti-Pancasila.

Second, Followers are the people who want to replace the state ideology Pancasila or are anti-Pancasila, and they have reasons that underlie their hatred against Pancasila. For example, considering Pancasila as a form of resistance to God's law, Pancasila as obsolete and irrelevant to current conditions, and various other reasons. However, they have not shown their hatred to others or the public. Or in other words, they have not manifested their anti-Pancasila in their social and political lives. Therefore, their stance on anti-Pancasila is passive.

This group category includes teenagers and adults. Many of them use religious perspectives to legitimize their perception of anti-Pancasila. They think that making Pancasila the basis of the state is against religion. Because the basis of all the rules in the world is scripture, as God's law, they think that Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia are man-made. Therefore, making Pancasila the basis of the state is

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[17] Markus Junianto Sihaloho. (2017, September 30). *Ahmad Basarah: Penghapusan P4 Menyebabkan Tumbuhnya Gerakan Anti-Pancasila.* Beritasatu. https://www.beritasatu.com/nasional/455513/ahmad-basarah-penghapusan-p4-menyebabkan-
     tumbuhnya-gerakan-antipancasila.

[18] *Lalu Mara Satriwangsa.* (2020, Maret 10). *Kalista Salah, tapi Lebih Salah MPR tahun 1998 yang Bubarkan BP7.* Kabargolkar. https://kabargolkar.com/read/kabar_opini/9624/kalista-salah-tapi-lebih-salah-mpr-tahun-1998-yang-bubarkan-bp7.

an act of *shirk* (associating things with God), a major sin. Others may think that Pancasila does not provide quite efficient and effective values to solve the problems of the state and or guide the state and nation to prosperity and better lives for tomorrow. However, in this case, they only believe that Pancasila is irrelevant. However, they do not join any anti-Pancasila movements and do not show the wider public that they were anti-Pancasila.

This group possesses more immediate and clearer threats to the state than the previous group. This is a fragile group that potentially be easily used by political groups and interests against the incumbent government or the state. This group has had a low level of collective consciousness, especially of consciousness of being Indonesia by rejecting Pancasila. Therefore, the people under this category need to be rehabilitated to their perception and understanding of the ideology of Pancasila.

Third, the militants are the people who want to replace the state ideology of Pancasila or are anti-Pancasila. They have reasons that underlie their hatred against Pancasila. Most importantly, they have actively invited others to hate Pancasila and are involved in movements that wish to replace Pancasila as the state's ideology directly and indirectly.

The people that fall under this group include the violent extremist and terrorist prisoners and their immediate families. A guardian of terrorist prisoners argues that many current terrorist prisoners are supported by their violent radical groups and their immediate families, such as their children, husband/wife, and parents. Therefore, according to him, rehabilitating and re-educating terrorist prisoners alone is not enough. The rehabilitation and reeducation programs need to be delivered to their families.

The people's character of this group is the same as the character of the second group, or the followers. However, they dare to show their followers as anti-Pancasila, have invited others not to like or reject Pancasila, and/or join anti-Pancasila movements or who want to change the ideology of Pancasila. Thus, all terrorist prisoners and their immediate or nuclear families may fall into this category.

The militant is a category that may be considered the most dangerous level because it has already manifested their hatred against Pancasila, especially the terrorist prisoners who also committed crimes against the state and humanity, such as suicide bombings and other terrors threaten communities in general. Militant has been real threats to Indonesia's state ideology and national security.

In Indonesia, the threats of militant groups toward the state's ideology have existed since the early days of Indonesia. Two major ideologies that threatened Pancasila were communism and Islamism. In September 1948, the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia) declared establishing the Indonesian Soviet Republic in Madiun, East Java. In 1949, an Islamist movement, the Indonesian Islamic State (Negara Islam Indonesia), or so-called NII, declared establishing an Islamic State in Tasikmalaya, West Java. In September 1965, the Indonesian Communist Party rebelled to establish a communist state again.

Indonesia succeeded in conquering these anti-Pancasila movements with an armed approach. During Suharto's military regime, these movements are almost impossible to develop. However, after the collapse of Suharto, these groups, especially the Islamist movement of Indonesia Islamic State (NII), manifested their ideology. Some of the NII

members were caught for terrorist crimes and involvement in the movement that wanted to establish an Islamic state. Therefore, historically the threats of militants to the existence of the state and its ideology are real. History also teaches that using a hard military approach is not enough to eradicate anti-Pancasila movements in Indonesia. It needs a more comprehensive approach to deal with the movements.

To sum up, the anti-Pancasila persons can be classified into three major social groups based on the level their depth of hatred and threats to the state, namely: 1) Supporters are people who are anti-Pancasila, but they do not know why they do so 2) Followers are people who are anti-Pancasila or agree if Pancasila is replaced, and they have their own (subjective) reasons for being anti-Pancasila, and 3) Militant are similar to followers (the second group), but their anti-Pancasila is active, either in the form of inviting others not to like Pancasila and or joining groups that want to change the ideology of Pancasila. And often, these groups campaign against the ideology of Pancasila by arguing the weakness of Pancasila itself. For example, rampant corruption cases are evidence that Pancasila is weak and incompatible with the nation's life and state today.

Therefore, based on the grouping of Anti-Pancasila, the strategy to instill Pancasila can also be classified based on the character of the anti-Pancasila, namely supporter (mild), follower (medium), and militant (heavy). However, this grouping does not indicate a degree of importance to policy. The three groups are equally important to be taken seriously because, in many cases, preventing and or treating serious supporters are more important than treating militants. Therefore, this grouping does not indicate the priority scale that must be responded to by the policy. The strategy for indoctrinating the Pancasila ideology is based on the classification of the groups as follows.

For the supporter group, it is necessary to carry out a tactical outreach strategy in introducing Pancasila. At least three important aspects need to be strengthened to instill cognitive, cultural, and social levels in the supporter group. First, at the cognitive level, the history and values of Pancasila are taught and inculcated in a more actual and interesting approach so that the targets of this group, especially children and youth, can get the right framing and understanding of Pancasila.

Second, Pancasila is introduced in more cultural and symbolic approaches, such as through arts performance and sports. In addition to Pancasila as the collective consciousness of the Indonesians, Pancasila as the identity of the younger generation needs to be strengthened so that they feel proud of Pancasila. This is because the cognitive aspect alone is not enough. Pancasila needs to be manifested in the real lives of citizens, especially the youths, for example, the convenience of wearing clothes with the logo of Garuda Pancasila.

Third, providing a conducive social environment that honors and nurtures the state ideology, Pancasila, to the youths. The government should create community centers or any institutions that frequently gather many people, especially educational institutions, as a conducive place to grow the commitment and consciousness of the student to the state ideology. Therefore, if some schools or teachers do not follow government policies such as weekly flag ceremonies (saluting the flag, singing Indonesia's national anthem, reading the

1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, reading Pancasila, and so on), and/or teaching anti-Pancasila, they should receive strict, clear and measurable sanctions.

However, identifying this group in persons is difficult, such as identifying name, address, and jobs. Threats from this group are mostly taken from the survey with anonymous data. Therefore, the specific target of indoctrination for this group is latent and unclear. Considering the character of this group, the spaces for indoctrination are the public spaces, where people meet and socialize, and the educational institutions, where people, or students, spend most of their time.

The follower group is slightly different from the supporter group because the followers have reasons for hating Pancasila and wanting to replace it. The initial step that needs to be done in the indoctrination of Pancasila is by deconstructing their perception of anti-Pancasila. They consider that Pancasila is bad and heretical. Changing something that is considered evil, bad, and misguided into something that is considered noble is not an easy and instant matter. It takes time, patience, and exemplary to deconstruct and reconstruct followers' perceptions. This deconstruction can be done by providing answers to the followers and their false beliefs. For example, people exposed to terrorism or hardline extremist ideologies are usually trapped in questions, such as: "choose one: Whom do you want to obey, the Prophet Muhammad or the President? Which values do you want to follow, the Quran or Pancasila?" It is quite often that for them respecting Pancasila is a form of betrayal of the religion.

In deconstructing the belief or understanding of this group (including those who are exposed to the ideology of terrorism and violent extremism), the government may strengthen the current program of *wasathiyah* Islam (moderate Islam). This concept may be developed easily to create the program to deconstruct the logic of anti-Pancasila. In addition, the government may also adopt the concepts that Nahdlatul Ulama have developed on Nusantara Islam (Islam Nusantara) and Muhammadiyah on Progressive Islam (Islam Berkemajuan) to develop materials for the construction and reconstruction of the right understanding of the state ideology, Pancasila.

Similar to the strategy for indoctrinating Pancasila to those who are anti-Pancasila, the strategy for the follower group needs to consider at least three important aspects, namely the cognitive, cultural, and social levels. The initial strategy for the deconstruction of people's perceptions is only at the cognitive level. Therefore, cultural and social strategies need to be employed to improve the indoctrination of Pancasila. The target group, the followers, should finally be bound to Pancasila culturally and live in a positive environment that is subject to and respects the ideology of Pancasila.

In comparison to the supporter group, the followers are more relatively identified. To some extent, there are some institutions, schools, and social organizations whose members are prone to be exposed and contaminated by the anti-Pancasila ideology. The government can indoctrinate the targeted group more easily.

The strategy of Pancasila's indoctrination for the militant group is almost the same as for the follower group. However, because this group of anti-Pancasila followers is already active, influencing other people and getting involved with the activities of groups that want to change the Pancasila ideology, a hard approach is needed. Therefore, people who incite

Pancasila in the public sphere must take a legal approach following applicable regulations. It is a form of social correction that must be carried out from an early age and at the same time to maintain the authority and collective consciousness of Pancasila as the unifying element of the nation.

Therefore, compared to the supporter and follower groups, the targets of the indoctrination for the militants are more easily identified by persons because they have been in the process justice systems, and most of them are in prisons. Even though they also need cognitive, cultural, and social approaches, the strategy for indoctrination is completely different. Many terrorist prisoners are overtly anti-Pancasila. They do not hesitate to show their hatred against the government, state, and Pancasila. A senior guardian argues:

Most terrorist prisoners are anti-Pancasila. Even when they have already declared their alliance with Pancasila and acknowledged their mistakes in the police prisoners (*Rumah tahanan*). However, after they moved to the prison (*Lembaga Pemasyarakatan*), we often witnessed that they still had a strong stance on anti-Pancasila. Many of them do not want to cooperate with the staff of the prisoners, including the guardian that accompanied them 24 hours a day. Some of them also do not want to join the programs in prison. They consider them as the chosen persons, while they treat us as people who are strayed from the right path.[19]

According to a guardian of terrorist prisoners, it is not easy to correct terrorists' misunderstanding of religion and nationalism. Many factors underline their hatred against Pancasila and their willingness to replace Pancasila with a religious ideology. People involved in terrorism maybe because of past grievances, poverty, relative deprivation, economic needs, friendship with terrorists, and little religious knowledge. Very often, violent religious understanding comes only to legitimize their criminal actions. Therefore, understanding the cause of terrorism is an important factor in formulating the strategy of indoctrinating state ideology, Pancasila.

Unlike the supporter and follower groups, deconstructing their understanding of Pancasila is more complex. A guardian of terrorist prisoners argues that he never talks about religion, nationalism, and Pancasila, even to the cooperative terrorist prisoner, because these are sensitive issues. He avoids talking about sensitive issues to the prisoner to avoid conflict and bad relationships with terrorist prisoners. However, when the trusted relationship is strongly established, he likes to discuss sensitive issues, especially nationalism.[20] Therefore, to deconstruct militants' perception of Pancasila, there is a need to build a trusted relationship between the guardians, faith professionals, and anyone who delivers the indoctrination of Pancasila on one hand, and the terrorist prisoners on the other hand.

Another important aspect that needs to take into account is the profile of the person who delivers the indoctrination and strategy to deconstruct the mind of terrorist prisoners. The person should be the non-high profile faith professionals identified as activists of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), military personnel, and police officers. According to some guardians, terrorist prisoners are sensitive and usually tend to avoid the

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[19] Interview with a guardian of terrorist prisoners on 26 November 2021.
[20] Interview with a guardian of terrorist prisoners on 14 December 2021.

profile of those persons. However, it is conditional and depends on how well indoctrinators approach the terrorist prisoners, the militant group.

Concerning strategy, as mentioned above, building trust is the fundamental factor in producing effective program indoctrination of Pancasila. Therefore, if the prison has no choice but to recruit and cooperate with the indoctrinators from the members of the Muhammadiyah and NU, police officers, and military personnel, their identities should be hidden so that it provides a learning milieu that is considered neutral and friendly for the terrorist prisoners, the militants.

Concerning the social approach, the indoctrination in the prison should focus on the prison and the family (wife/husband, child, and parents). The militants and terrorist prisoners relatively live in isolated spaces. Noncooperative and dangerous terrorist prisoners live in super-maximum-security or one-person one-cell prisons;. In contrast, cooperative terrorist prisoners live in medium prisons. They can interact with other prisoners but are still limited. Therefore, other social aspects that need to be noticed are the family members of the terrorist prisoners. They need to be indoctrinated, and if they are normal citizens, they need to be supported to secure their nationalist ideology, Pancasila.

CONCLUSION

Once, Indonesia had the Decree of People's Consultative Assembly (TAP MPR RI Number II/MPR/1978 of 1978 concerning the guidelines to protect the ideology of the state, which was so-called, Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Guidelines for the Appreciation and Practice of Pancasila), or P4. However, over time, this decree was deemed ineffective. Therefore, it was revoked by the Decree of the People's Consultative Assembly Number XVIII/MPR/1998 of 1998 concerning Revocation of Decision of the People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia Number II/MPR/1978. Many people criticize this policy because it is considered not to provide a solution to the problems of indoctrination and implementation of Pancasila in the life of the nation and state. Many even blame the latter decree for the emergence of anti-Pancasila people and groups.

The big question that arises is how to indoctrinate Pancasila to the people who are already antipathetic to Pancasila. In searching for this answer, the author starts by categorizing the level of people on their understanding, attitude, and behavior of being anti-Pancasila, how they view Pancasila, and what strategy is for indoctrinating Pancasila in their lives.

Anti-Pancasila groups can be categorized into three groups, namely supporters (light), followers (medium), and militant (heavy). Each category represents the level of people's dislikes towards Pancasila, and therefore it has different consequences for indoctrination strategies. First, supporters are those who are anti-Pancasila but do not know the reason, such as children and youth, either because of their parents or the surrounding environment (such as schools). Therefore, the key to the problem lies in the current socialization of Pancasila, including the educational, cultural, and social approaches. Second, followers are those who are anti-Pancasila and have reasons not to like Pancasila, but they do not show it to the public. Therefore, the key to solving the problem is not only the socialization of Pancasila but also the deconstruction of their understanding of Pancasila. Third, militants

are those who are anti-Pancasila, have reasons, and have manifested their thought in real life, such as inciting Pancasila to the public or joining groups, or terrorism, that wants to replace the Pancasila ideology from the Republic of Indonesia. Or in other words, militants are mostly terrorist prisoners and former terrorist prisoners. Therefore, the key to the solution is the law enforcement and deconstruction of not only their understanding of Pancasila but also understanding their violent extremist values.

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